New working paper: Research Waves, with Mariagiovanna Baccara and Gilat Levy.
Abstract: Competing lines of research start and grow as information is gradually uncovered by scientists who, driven by career incentives, sort themselves into fields. We build a strategic experimentation framework in which agents irreversibly specialize in one of two risky fields, and information updates are more frequent as more agents specialize in a field, and we describe the equilibrium forces that determine the size, shape, and length of such research waves. We show that in the bad news case, all researchers specialize in one field, generating a unique bandwagon wave. As the difference in prior beliefs increases, such wave starts earlier, grows more slowly, and becomes longer. In the good news case, both fields can be explored in equilibrium in two sequential surges. The probability of both fields being explored increases in the researchers' pool size and in the efficacy of technology. We also assess the impact of policies used in the scientific community, such as
citations benefits, tenure clocks, and grants, on the structure of the equilibrium research waves.
Paper available upon request