Bienvenue !
I am a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Microeconomics at the University of Bonn.
My research focuses on mechanism design, information design and behavioral economics.
I obtained my PhD in economics at Sciences Po in 2023.
Here is my CV.
Contact:
University of Bonn, Institute for Microeconomics
Lennéstraße 37, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Working papers
Redistribution Through Market Segmentation (with Daniel Barreto and Alexis Ghersengorin)
Extended abstract, Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24).
We study how to optimally segment monopolistic markets with a redistributive objective. We characterize optimal redistributive segmentations and show that they (i) induce the seller to price progressively, i.e., richer consumers pay higher prices than poorer ones, and (ii) may not maximize consumer surplus, instead granting extra profits to the monopolist. We further show that optimal redistributive segmentations are implementable via price-based regulation.
Non-Market Screening with Investment (with Eduardo Perez-Richet) New draft coming soon.
Extended abstract, Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24).
Rewards (e.g., prizes, labels, money) are often allocated to agents based on a measured characteristic or aggregate—commonly called a score. This paper studies how a principal should optimally allocate rewards when: (i) the underlying characteristic and reward are complements in her preferences, and (ii) agents can strategically invest to enhance their scores (and, to some extent, manipulate them). Our main result shows that, in a broad class of environments, optimal mechanisms take the form of simple cutoff rules that grant the highest reward to agents whose scores exceed a specified threshold while offering nothing below this threshold. Notably, intermediary rewards and randomization provide no additional benefit to the principal. This finding establishes a stronger theoretical foundation and provides a potential explanation for the prevalence of binary ``pass or fail'' rules in environments where agents can strategically invest in response to screening mechanisms.
We study a persuasion problem in which a sender designs an information structure to induce a non-Bayesian receiver to take a particular action. The receiver, who is privately informed about his preferences, is a wishful thinker: he is systematically overoptimistic about the most favorable outcomes. We show that wishful thinking can lead to a qualitative shift in the structure of optimal persuasion compared to the Bayesian case, whenever the sender is uncertain about what the receiver perceives as the best-case outcome in his decision problem.
Work in progress
The Economics of Convex Function Intervals (with Lina Uhe)